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From the Viewpoint of the Poor: An
Analysis of the Constitutionality of the
Restriction on Class Action Involvement by
Legal Services Attorneys
Ilisabeth Smith Bornsteint
In 1996, Congress limited opportunities for the poor to pur-
sue a class action lawsuit by forbidding legal services providers
that receive federal funds from initiating or participating in class
action lawsuits.' The class action prohibition was one of many
restrictions imposed on the activities of federally funded legal
services providers.2 Although the Supreme Court struck down one
such restriction as unconstitutional,3 no court has ruled yet on
the constitutionality of the class action prohibition.4
This Comment suggests that the class action prohibition is
unconstitutional because it represents impermissible viewpoint
discrimination. Part I of the Comment reviews the history and
mandate of the Legal Services Corporation, examines the legisla-
tive history behind the class action prohibition, and provides an
overview of legal challenges to the 1996 restrictions. Part II sets
out the relevant law on viewpoint neutrality and explains why
the restriction on class actions can be considered viewpoint dis-
criminatory. Part III examines whether the government has a
compelling state interest in promulgating the restriction and con-
cludes that there is no such interest.
B.A. 1997, Yale University; J.DJM.P.P. Candidate 2004, University of Chicago.
See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub L No
104-134, 110 Stat 1321 (1996) (hereinafter "1996 Act"), § 504(a)(7).
See 42 USC § 2996f(b) (2000).
See Legal Services Corp v Velazquez, 531 US 533 (2001).
At the time of publication, one case challenging the class action prohibition was
pending in federal district court in New York. See Dobbins v Legal Services Corporation,
01 Civ 8371 (FB) (E D NY filed Dec 14, 2001), consolidated with Legal Services Corpora-
tion v Velazquez, 97 Civ 00182 (FB). For more information on the Dobbins case, see the
Brennan Center's Access to Justice project online at <http://www.brennancenter.org/
programs/prog htdobvelindex.html> (visited Oct 15, 2003).
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I. THE LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION AND CHALLENGES TO THE
1996 RESTRICTIONS
A. History and Mandate of the Legal Services Corporation
The Legal Services Corporation ("LSC") is a nonprofit entity
whose purpose is to provide "financial support for legal assistance
in noncriminal proceedings or matters to persons financially un-
able to afford legal assistance."5 Congress created the LSC in
1974 to ensure equal access to the court system.' The LSC pro-
vides financial support by making grants of federal money to local
organizations that provide free legal services to the poor.7 Con-
gress decided to fund the LSC and the corresponding local legal
aid providers because it recognized that "providing legal assis-
tance to those who face an economic barrier to adequate legal
counsel will serve best the ends of justice and assist in improving
opportunities for low-income persons consistent with the pur-
poses of this Act."8
In 1996, Congress passed a sweeping set of restrictions on
the activities of agencies that receive funds from the LSC.9 One of
the restrictions forbids the involvement of LSC-funded attorneys
in class action lawsuits."° The ban on class action involvement
originated from a perception that the initial purpose of the LSC
was to fund the needs of individuals only, not the needs of a class
of poor people," and a restriction on class action involvement was
42 USC § 2996b(a) (2000).See 42 USC § 2996(1)-(2).
See Velazquez v Legal Services Corp, 164 F3d 757, 759 (2d Cir 1999), affd 531 US
533 (2001).
42 USC § 2996(3).
1996 Act, 110 Stat 1321. Although states also have imposed similar restrictions on
money derived from Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA), this Comment focuses
only on federal restrictions. For a discussion of the role of IOLTA funds in supporting local
legal service providers, see Washington Legal Foundation v Legal Foundation of Washing-
ton, 271 F3d 835, 841-45 (9th Cir 2001), affd sub nom Brown v Legal Foundation, 2003 US
LEXIS 2493.
'° 1996 Act at § 504(a)(7) ("None of the funds appropriated in this Act to the Legal
Services Corporation may be used to provide financial assistance to any person or entity
.. that initiates or participates in a class action suit.").
" See Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agen-
cies Appropriations Act, 1996, Domenici amendment No 2819, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Sept
29, 1995), remarks of Senator Pete V. Domenici (NM), in 141 Cong Rec S 14573, 14608
("[Tihe reason for the [prohibition against class actions] is because legal services ... [was
intended] to represent individual poor people in individual cases, not to represent a class
of poor people."). See also Life After Legal Services, Wash Post A18 (Sept 18, 1995) (edito-
rializing that the LSC was originally intended to meet the needs that the poor brought
individually, and that any action helping the poor as a whole is counter to the original
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necessary to restore the program to its original purpose of repre-
senting individual poor clients. 12 According to advocates of the
1996 restrictions, representation of the individual needs of the
indigent involves providing legal aid for "day-to-day legal needs"
only. 3 Activities such as fighting welfare reform and engaging in
class action lawsuits were restricted because they were not con-
sidered part of the provision of day-to-day legal needs. 4 Prior to
the 1996 restrictions, however, LSC-funded organizations used
class actions often and with substantial success to represent their
clients' interests on everyday matters ranging from housing is-
sues to medical needs to voting. 5
In addition to the requirement that LSC fund only civil suits,
Congress historically has placed other restrictions on the use of
its funds. 6 One such restriction prohibits the LSC from using its
purpose of the LSC). But see Marie A. Failinger and Larry May, Litigating Against Pov-
erty: Legal Services and Group Representation, 45 Ohio St L J 1, 14, 20 (1984) (arguing
that the federally funded poverty law program was directed from its inception to serve the
interests of the poor as a group).
" See Legal Services Corporation, Supplementary Information Regarding the Final
Rule on Class Action Participation, 61 Fed Reg 63754 (1996) (amending 45 CFR § 1617).
" Legal Services Corporation, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Commercial and
Administrative Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong, 2d Sess 26
(2002) (statement of Kenneth F. Boehm, Chairman, National Legal and Policy Center).
14 See id at 35 (noting that class action lawsuits divert resources away from the provi-
sion of legal assistance for the poor's day-to-day legal problems).
" See, for example, California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc v Legal Services Corpora-
tion, 917 F2d 1171 (9th Cir 1990) (enjoining the enforcement of an LSC provision which
would have prohibited the distribution of LSC funds to permanent residents who had been
granted amnesty); Johnson v United States Department of Agriculture, 734 F2d 774 (11th
Cir 1984) (granting a preliminary injunction to rural housing loan borrowers to prevent
non-judicial foreclosure of their properties); Bliek v Palmer, 916 F Supp 1475 (N D Iowa
1996), affd 102 F3d 1472 (8th Cir 1997) (finding that the due process rights of a class of
food stamp recipients were violated when they were not notified of the Department of
Human Services's right to collect overpayment of food stamp benefits); Bonner v Housing
Authority of Atlanta, No 1:94 CV 376 MHS (N D Ga 1995) (challenging Atlanta Housing
Authority's policy of denying housing to applicants with criminal history); Jordan v City of
Greenwood, Mississippi, 599 F Supp 397 (N D Miss 1984) (finding that city government
violates the Voting Rights Act); Shadis v Beal, Civil Action No 75-3421 (E D Pa 1975)(providing medical benefits to the medically needy). See also David S. Udell, The Legal
Services Restrictions: Lawyers in Florida, New York, Virginia and Oregon Describe the
Costs, 17 Yale L & Pol Rev 337, 346-47 (1998) (describing successful class actions litigated
by Oregon Legal Services); Jessica A. Roth, It is Lawyers We are Funding: A Constitu-
tional Challenge to the 1996 Restrictions on the Legal Services Corporation, 33 Harv CR-
CL L Rev 107, 154 n 278 (1998) (describing successful Supreme Court cases brought by
LSC lawyers).
" See Velazquez v Legal Services Corp, 985 F Supp 323, 327 (E D NY 1997). For a
history of restrictions on the use of LSC funds, see 42 USC § 2996f(b). See also Alan W.
Houseman, Restrictions by Funders and the Ethical Practice of Law, 67 Fordham L Rev
2187, 2191 (1999) (noting that although the LSC's activities have been restricted since the
program's inception, only recently have the restrictions been imposed by Congress, as
opposed to the administrative agency overseeing the program). For general discussion of
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funds to support or promote political activities or interests.17 Con-
gress implemented this restriction in recognition that the legal
services program needed to be kept free from "the influence of or
use by it of political pressures" in order for the program to sur-
vive. 8 The types of political activity originally intended to be pro-
hibited include influencing the result of an election,"' contributing
to political parties or campaigns, ° and running for office." Over
time, the definition of "political activities" has been broadened to
include campaigns on ballot propositions and school desegrega-
tion litigation.2
When President Richard Nixon created the LSC, he recog-
nized that "Legal Services is concerned with social issues and is
thus subject to unusually strong political pressures .... [Ilf we
are to preserve the strength of the program, we must make it
immune to political pressure and make it a permanent part of our
justice system." 3 "Political pressures," as used in this context,
referred to a fear that legal aid providers funded by the state
24
might be subject to pressure by powerful community interests.
An independent federal corporation was established expressly to
ward off pressure from such constituencies.2 More recently, some
have redefined "political" as the point of view LSC-funded attor-
the political climate at the time of the LSC formation, see Arthur R. Miller, Of Franken-
stein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem,", 92
Harv L Rev 664, 678-80 (1979) (noting that at the time of the LSC enactment in 1974, the
legal culture had gone through a swing of great enthusiasm and great antipathy towards
class actions and was only just starting to balance out the excesses); Failinger and May,
45 Ohio St L J at 51 (cited in note 11) (noting that opponents of the LSC have attempted
to restrict class action filings on behalf of the poor since the LSC's inception in 1974).
17 See 45 CFR § 1608.1 (2002).
2 42 USC § 2996(5).
19 45 CFR § 1608.5(a).
Id at § 1608.5(b).
2 Id at § 1608.5(c).
See Reforming an 'Incredibly Political' Agency, Interview with Donald Bogard,
President, Legal Services Corporation, US News & World Rep 66 (Oct 31, 1983) (charac-
terizing campaigns on ballot propositions and implementation of school desegregation as
political in nature). But see Interview with Archibald Cox, End Legal-Aid Program for
Poor?, US News & World Rep 33 (Aug 3, 1981) (arguing that the characterization of legal
aid attorneys as political activists is incorrect because it is the nature of the legal system
for a party to press its views of what the law ought to be).
' Francis J. Larkin, The Legal Services Corporation Must be Saved, 34 Judges' J 1
(Winter 1995).
" See Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agen-
cies Appropriations Act, 1996, Domenici amendment No 2819, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Sept
29, 1995), Remarks of Senator Edward M. Kennedy (MA), in 141 Cong Rec S 14611,
14611-12.
' Id.
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neys take on behalf of their clients.26 This is despite President
Nixon's recognition that legal services are concerned with social
issues which, practically by definition, are subject to political
pressures.27
B. Challenges to the 1996 Restrictions
1. Legal Services Corporation v Velazquez.
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of one of
the 1996 LSC restrictions in 2001, when it held that a restriction
prohibiting LSC-funded attorneys from challenging existing wel-
fare law violated the Constitution.8 In Legal Services Corporation
v Velazquez, 2 a group consisting of indigent clients and their law-
yers, employed by grantees of funding from the LSC, challenged
the constitutionality of restrictions on advocacy in welfare cases.0
This restriction on "suits for benefits'l prohibited LSC attorneys
from arguing the constitutionality of any existing welfare laws.
Under the suits for benefits restriction, attorneys were permitted
to sue welfare agencies for recovery and payment of benefits but
were not allowed to challenge the law under which the client
sought benefits.32
The Court held the restriction against welfare law challenges
to be unconstitutional because it constituted unacceptable view-
point discrimination."2 Regulations that restrict expression of a
particular point of view generally violate the First Amendment.34
However, a viewpoint-based funding decision may be sustained in
two instances: (1) if the government is the speaker, or (2) if the
See discussion in Part II.
Note that Nixon specifically distinguishes social issues from political pressures. See
Larkin, 34 Judges' J at 1 (cited in note 23).
See Legal Services Corp v Velazquez, 531 US 533, 536-37 (2001).
531 US 533 (2001).
Id at 537.
31 See id at 540.
2 See 1996 Act § 504(a)(16).
Velazquez, 531 US at 537.
' Kathleen M. Sullivan and Gerald Gunther, First Amendment Law 212 (Foundation
2d ed 2003). See also Rosenberger v Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 US
819, 828 (1995) ("Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be
unconstitutional."); RA. V. v City of St Paul, 505 US 377, 382 (1992) ("Content-based regu-
lations are presumptively invalid.").
' See Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System v Southworth, 529 US 217,
229, 235 (2000).
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.government is using private speakers to promote a governmental
36
message.
The Court in Velazquez determined that the LSC program fit
neither exception to the prohibition against viewpoint discrimina-
tion.37 The Court did not consider the government to be speaking,
finding instead that "advice from the attorney to the client and
the advocacy by the attorney to the courts cannot be classified as
governmental speech."3' Nor did the Court view the attorneys as
private speakers promoting the government's message.39 Because
the LSC funding neither constituted nor was intended to promote
governmental speech, the government was not entitled to impose
any viewpoint-based restrictions. °
As further evidence that the restrictions constituted imper-
missible viewpoint discrimination, the Court noted that the re-
strictions improperly limited freedom of speech rights, resulting
in a distortion of the legal system." The Court found that the
government was using an existing medium of expression, legal
advocacy, and controlling it, via the restriction against suits for
benefits, in such a way that the implementation of the restriction
would have distorted the usual functioning of the medium." Ac-
cording to the Court, restricting how LSC-funded attorneys may
advise their clients and what arguments these attorneys may
present to the court in suits for benefits sufficiently distorts the
functioning of the judiciary by altering the traditional role of at-
torneys.43
Moreover, the Court found that the restriction threatened to
impair judicial function by insulating laws from judicial scru-
tiny. 4 According to the Court, the restriction against suits for
benefits was an attempt by the government "to define the scope of
the litigation it funds to exclude certain vital theories and
ideas."45 This attempt to circumscribe attorneys and litigants was
" See Rosenberger, 515 US at 833. The rationale for these exceptions is that when the
government is trying to support a viewpoint, either directly or indirectly, it is entitled to
make sure that its message is not garbled or distorted, such as by including contrary
viewpoints. See id.
Velazquez, 531 US at 542-43.
Id.
'9 Id.
o Id.
Velazquez, 531 US at 544.
42 Id at 543.
41 Id at 544.
Id at 546.
Velazquez, 531 US at 548.
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held unconstitutional because it implied that Congress might be
allowed to impose "rules and conditions which in effect insulate
its own laws from legitimate judicial challenge."'
The governmental policies at issue in Velazquez were insu-
lated from judicial challenge because the Court found no ade-
quate alternative avenue for a client to seek legal assistance.7
This outcome was unacceptable to the Court, which noted that
"[t]he explicit premise for providing LSC attorneys is the neces-
sity to make available representation 'to persons financially un-
able to afford legal assistance.""'8
2. Legal Aid Society of Hawaii v Legal Services Corporation.
While the Velazquez case was still pending in lower courts,
the Legal Aid Society of Hawaii ("LASH") sued LSC, claiming
that all of the 1996 restrictions were unconstitutional. 49 The
plaintiffs in LASH initially sought an injunction preventing the
LSC from enforcing the 1996 regulations. ° The preliminary in-
junction was granted on the grounds that some of the restrictions
implicated First Amendment rights of association,5 but the court
declined to extend the First Amendment right of association to
class actions.52 At the time of the first LASH decision, no higher
court had extended First Amendment protection to class actions
and the district court was reluctant to do so without appellate
precedent.53 The district court did note that an earlier Supreme
Court case had implied a potential constitutional right to pursue
a class action,54 but ultimately the district court feared that ex-
tending the rights of association to protect the right to file class
actions would make class actions a constitutional entitlement.55
Id.
See id at 546.
Id, quoting 42 USC § 2996(a)(3).
41 See Legal Aid Society of Hawaii v Legal Services Corp, 145 F3d 1017, 1022-23 (9th
Cir 1998), cert denied 525 US 1015 (1998) (hereinafter "LASH").
50 See Legal Aid Society of Hawaii v Legal Services Corp, 961 F Supp 1402, 1410 (D
Hawaii 1997), affd in relevant part, 145 F3d 1017 (9th Cir 1998), cert denied, 525 US 1015
(1998) (questioning whether the First Amendment right to associate for the purpose of
engaging in litigation as a form of political expression extends to class actions).
Id at 1408-09, 1411.
Id at 1410-11.
Id at 1410.
See California Motor Transport Co v Trucking Unlimited, 404 US 508, 510-11
(1972) ("[1It would be destructive of rights of association and of petition to hold that groups
with common interests may not ... use the channels and procedures of state and federal
agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points of view.").
6 LASH, 961 F Supp at 1410.
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The appellate level proceedings in LASH did not address the
First Amendment arguments because the class action prohibition
was not the subject of the appeal. Instead, the Ninth Circuit fo-
cused on the constitutionality of the regulations as a whole." The
court examined whether the 1996 restrictions represented uncon-
stitutional conditions,57 and addressed a more general concern
regarding the degree to which federally funded organizations
could engage in restricted activities with non-federal funds.58 Ul-
timately, the Ninth Circuit found the restrictions constitutional
because the "program-integrity" regulations59 issued by Congress
sufficiently provided an alternate avenue by which to engage in
restricted activities."
3. New York cases-Varshavsky v Geller and Dobbins v Legal
Services Corporation.
Although the federal courts routinely have avoided ruling on
the class action prohibition, a state Supreme Court in New York
scrutinized the restriction on engaging in class action lawsuits."
LASH, 145 F3d at 1020.
" Id at 1024. The "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine provides that Congress can-
not condition the receipt of a benefit on the relinquishment of a constitutional right. See
Rust v Sullivan, 500 US 173, 196 (1991). For further illustration of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, see Speiser v Randall, 357 US 513 (1958) (finding it unconstitutional
to condition receipt of a property-tax exemption on an oath not to advocate the overthrow
of federal or state government because such an act penalized certain forms of speech).
LASH, 145 F3d at 1028-29.
Program integrity regulations, developed to address the needs of organizations that
receive both federal and non-federal funding, describe how organizations can use non-
federal money to pursue a purpose prohibited by the conditions of the federal money. See,
for example, Rust, 500 US at 187-88 (describing how non-federal funds may be used to
provide health care services that cannot be funded with federal funds).
® LASH, 145 F3d at 1024-25. In adjudging the constitutionality of the restrictions,
the Ninth Circuit used the standard of review put forth in Rust for facial challenges to
legislative acts: "the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid. The fact that [the regulations] might operate unconstitu-
tionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render [them]
wholly invalid." Rust, 500 US at 183. The Ninth Circuit upheld the restrictions at issue in
LASH because of their similarity to the regulations upheld by the Supreme Court in Rust.
LASH, 145 F3d at 1025. The constitutionality of the LSC's program integrity regulations
was not addressed by the Supreme Court in Velazquez. The Second Circuit addressed the
issue briefly but ultimately upheld the regulations because the Velazquez plaintiffs could
not sustain a facial challenge to the regulations. See Velazquez, 164 F3d at 767 (finding
that the plaintiffs failed to show that "no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid"). The court expressed doubt, however, that regulations modeled on those
upheld in Rust would by definition provide adequate avenues for protected expression. See
id at 766.
1 See Varshavsky v Geller, No 49767/91, (NY Supreme Ct, NY County Dec 24, 1996)
reprinted in NY L J 22 col 2 (Dec 31, 1996).
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In Varshavsky v Geller,62 the court found the 1996 restriction
against class actions unconstitutional, but only to the extent that
the restriction limited what recipient organizations could do with
non-federal funds." The court held that the restriction penalized
the LSC recipient "for engaging in political expression that Con-
gress disapproves of using funds wholly independent of the fed-
eral government."' After the Varshavsky decision, the LSC regu-
lations were amended regarding the use of non-LSC money.65 The
Varshavsky case, therefore, does not provide any instructive
analysis of the class action prohibition since the case was decided
before the LSC amended its regulations to include the program
integrity regulations upheld by the Ninth Circuit in LASH.
There is a case currently pending in federal district court in
New York, Dobbins v Legal Services Corporation,66 which seeks to
challenge the class action prohibition. The Dobbins plaintiffsjoined the Velazquez plaintiffs to seek a preliminary injunction
against the 1996 restriction on the uses of non-LSC funds by an
LSC-funded organization.67 While Dobbins focuses on the extent
to which Congress may control a non-profit organization's use of
non-federal funds, the Dobbins plaintiffs also contend that the
government's "selective exclusion of the clients of LSC grantees"
from utilizing the class action device constitutes viewpoint dis-
crimination.68
The remainder of this Comment applies content-neutrality analy-
sis to the class action prohibition to examine how the restriction
could constitute viewpoint discrimination, and then explores
whether the government has any interests that are compelling
enough to justify such viewpoint discrimination.
No 49767/91, (NY Supreme Ct, NY County Dec 24, 1996) reprinted in NY L J 22 col
2 (Dec 31, 1996).
6 Id.
6 Id.
" See 45 CFR §§ 1610 et seq. See also id at 1610.8 (describing program integrity
standards for the use of non-LSC funds); LASH, 145 F3d at 1023 (explaining the revision
of the regulations).
01 Civ 8371 (FB) (E D NY filed Dec 14, 2001).
For more information on the Dobbins case, see the website for the Brennan Center
for Justice at New York University Law School (cited in note 4).
Velazquez v Legal Services Corporation 97 Civ 00182 / Dobbins v Legal Services
Corporation 01 Civ 8371, Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for a Pre-
liminary Injunction at 64-65 n 66 (E D NY Dec, 2001), available online at
<httpJ/www.brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/dobbins brief.pdf> (visited Oct 14,
2003).
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II. THE CLASS ACTION PROHIBITION AND VIEWPOINT NEUTRALITY
Before analyzing the class action prohibition for viewpoint
discrimination, it is necessary to clarify whether the speech at
issue is governmental or private. How a court characterizes
speech involved in the subsidization of legal services guides the
extent of the viewpoint neutrality analysis.
A. Nature of the Speech
When the government establishes a subsidy for specified
ends, it may impose certain restrictions in order to define the lim-
its and purpose of the program" and to ensure that its message is
not garbled or distorted.7" The Court in Velazquez found that "the
LSC program was designed to facilitate private speech, not to
promote a governmental message."7 In determining that the
speech was not governmental, the Court examined whether the
LSC-funded attorneys were acting as private speakers transmit-
ting a governmental message.7 The Court determined that the
attorneys were not conveying a governmental message since they
were funded by Congress to represent the interests of indigent
clients.73
The Court reached this conclusion in the specific context of
suits for benefits, in which the government's voice is represented
by the opposing counsel, whose job is to defend the government's
policy.74 In the class action context, most of the indigent's issues
are institutional in nature and involve the government as an ad-
versary.7 Although this is not always the case, the finding of pri-
vate speech in Velazquez necessarily extends to the entire func-
tion of the LSC. As an initial matter, it would be counter-intuitive
for an LSC-funded attorney's advocacy to be considered private in
some cases and governmental in others. Additionally, the restric-
tion on suits for benefits illustrates the larger principle that the
LSC program presumes the necessity of private, nongovernmen-
See Velazquez, 531 US at 543.
70 See Rosenberger v Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 US 819, 833
(1995).
7' Velazquez, 531 US at 542.
7' Because this issue involved a subsidy from the government to other actors, it was
unnecessary for the Court to examine whether the government itself was speaking.
13 Velazquez, 531 US at 542.
7  d.
7 See Failinger and May, 45 Ohio St L J at 18, 30-31 (cited in note 11).
[2003:702
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tal speech. 76 The Court in Velazquez stated that the "advice from
the attorney to the client and the advocacy by the attorney to the
courts cannot be classified as governmental speech"7 7 without
qualifying only certain circumstances in which this might be so.
Accordingly, an LSC-funded attorney's actions are likely to be
characterized as private speech regardless of what he or she ar-
gues.
B. Viewpoint and Content Neutrality
At first blush, the prohibition on federally-subsidized class
actions may appear to be a content-neutral regulation since the
restriction on class action involvement does not regulate content
on its face. Adherents to this view may perceive class actions as
purely procedural devices, containing no content to regulate.
Nonetheless, a closer examination of these arguments, particu-
larly in light of the Velazquez analysis, reveals how the restric-
tion on class actions constitutes viewpoint discrimination.
1. Finding substantive content.
One objection against finding viewpoint discrimination in the
restriction on class actions concerns the nature of class actions.
Those who view class actions as solely procedural devices might
perceive the ban on class actions as content-neutral, reasoning
that a procedural device contains no content to be regulated."
Such a narrow view, however, is misleading, for a growing body of
scholarship argues that class actions have a significant substan-
tive component and are not merely self-contained procedural de-
vices."
16 Velazquez, 531 US at 543.
'7 Id at 542-543.78 For examples of explicit references to class actions as procedural devices, see De-
posit Guaranty National Bank of Jackson, Mississippi v Roper, 445 US 326, 331 (1980);
Markham R. Leventhal, Class Actions: Fundamentals of Certification Analysis, 72 Fla Bar
J 10, 10 (1998).
" See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: The Need for a Hard Second
Look, 4 CLP Manhattan Institute (Mar 2002), available online at <http://www.manhattan-
institute.org/cjr_04.pdf> (visited Oct 14, 2003) (explaining how the class action procedure
affects an individual's substantive rights); Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the De-
mocratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals,
2003 U Chi Legal F 71 (arguing that class actions serve to alter substantive law); Fred
Misko Jr. and Frank E. Goodrich, Managing Complex Litigation: Class Actions and Mass
Torts, 48 Baylor L Rev 1001, 1005 (1996) (describing class actions as both a procedural
703
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Several points elicit how and why the class action has sub-
stantive content. First, despite appearing to be "neutral" and "de-
signed to facilitate implementation of existing substantive law,"
the effect of the class action is to transform and modify substan-
tive law.8" Second, the class action suit has long been recognized
as a means to equalize8 and empower" litigants. In the context of
legal services providers, the inability of attorneys to file class ac-
tion lawsuits on behalf of their clients essentially limits the pro-
cedures available to these clients, which puts them on unequal
footing with other potential litigants whose procedural opportuni-
ties are not restricted.83 The result is a substantive effect on the
law.
Although there is disagreement about whether using class
actions to change substantive law constitutes "furtive" and "sur-
reptitious" attempts to effect new laws,84 or simply is a natural
part of the legal process,85 it is widely recognized in many areas of
the law that class actions do, in fact, change substantive law. For
example, the process of class certification shapes substantive
claims by plaintiffs in human rights class actions.88 Similarly, in
the field of mass torts, class actions produce substantive changes
in the law87 and have been proposed as a method by which to re-
device and "a complex instrument of social change"); Kathryn L. Boyd, Collective Rights
Adjudication in U.S. Courts: Enforcing Human Rights at the Corporate Level, 1999 BYU L
Rev 1139, 1165-68 (examining the substantive consequences of class procedure in the
human rights context).
Redish, 2003 U Chi Legal F at 73 (cited in note 79).
, See William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 Cardozo
L Rev 1865, 1881 (2002), citing Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contempo-
rary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U Chi L Rev 684, 686 (1941) ("Modern society seems
increasingly to expose men to such group injuries for which individually they are in a poor
position to seek legal redress, either because they do not know enough or because such
redress is disproportionately expensive."). See also Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come
Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L & Soc Rev 95, 141-44 (1974)
(arguing that class actions help level the playing field between the "haves" and."have
nots").
" See Kathy L. Cerminara, The Class Action Suit As a Method of Patient Empower-
ment in the Managed Care Setting, 24 Am J L and Med 7, 9 (1998) (describing how pa-
tients use the class action to address more effectively concerns in the health care system).
Rubenstein, 23 Cardozo L Rev at 1872 (cited in note 81).
Redish, 2003 U Chi Legal F at 114-15 (cited in note 79).
See Geoffrey B. Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device Upon the Substantive
Law, 58 FRD 299, 307 (1973) (arguing that the purpose of procedure is to modify the sub-
stantive law since the law is not meant to be static).
See Boyd, 1999 BYU L Rev at 1165 (cited in note 79).
'7 See Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform via Rule 23, 80
Cornell L Rev 858, 860-61 (1995) (examining how state laws may be circumvented by
certifying classes in mass tort litigation).
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solve problems of proving causation.88 These examples demon-
strate how the class action amplifies procedural devices to effect
substantive change."9
The congressional response to class actions, particularly in
the context of the LSC, also has emphasized the substantive ef-
fects of the class action rather than its role as a procedural de-
vice. Discussions surrounding the 1996 restrictions demonstrate
this perception of the class action. The LSC was described as
promoting a "liberal agenda"9° and serving "left-wing causes,"9 1
and its attorneys were characterized as "political activists" who
use "exotic theories" to pursue cases beyond small claims and
municipal courts.s2 Activities such as class actions were restricted
because Congress did not approve of using LSC funds to advance
"political or ideological ends" that offended conservative views."
These descriptions all represent views on the substantive effects
of class actions. Although discussion of legislative motive is not
directly relevant to constitutional analysis,94 it is useful to show
that class actions are not purely procedural devices and that
regulation of class actions can be examined for content-
neutrality.
2. Express regulation of content.
A second objection to finding viewpoint discrimination in the
restriction on class actions is that the restriction does not regu-
late content on its face. The ban on class actions is not restricted
to certain subjects, such as class actions on housing issues. Nor
does the restriction expressly forbid class actions that take a cer-
tain viewpoint. The restriction prohibits initiation or participa-
tion in any class action suit, regardless of the content of legal dis-
pute or the viewpoint advocated by the LSC attorney in such a
' See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public
Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv L Rev 851 (1984).
See Epstein, 4 CLP Manhattan Institute at 16 (cited in note 79).
Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act 1996, Remarks of Senator Bob Dole (KS), 104th Cong, 1st Sess, (Sept
29, 1995), in 141 Cong Rec S 14573, 14605.
"' Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act 2000, Remarks of Representative Dave Weldon (FL), 106th Cong, 1st
Sess, (Aug 4, 1999), in 145 Cong Rec H 6983, 7004.
92 Id at 7005, Remarks of Representative Norman D. Dicks (WA).
Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act 1996, Remarks of Senator Slade Gorton (WA), 104th Cong, 1st Sess,
(Sept 29, 1995), in 141 Cong Rec S 14611, 14614.
' See United States v O'Brien, 391 US 367, 382-84 (1980).
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suit.95 For these reasons, the argument goes, the restriction must
be found constitutional.
This same reasoning was used, and rejected, in Velazquez.
The Court in Velazquez relied on the Second Circuit's analysis
that the restriction on suits for benefits sought to discourage ad-
vocacy for reform of government policy.96 By denying funding for
welfare cases that challenge existing welfare law, the restriction
discouraged viewpoints that challenged the status quo.97 Because
the speech at issue involved the right to criticize the government
and advocate change in government policy, it was subject to the
First Amendment's strongest protection.99 The Second Circuit
then noted that because the courtroom is recognized as the prime
marketplace for exposing ideas regarding the constitutionality or
legality of a government rule,99 such viewpoint discrimination
effectively drives the idea-here, of welfare reform-from the
marketplace.
As further evidence that the suits for benefits provision was
not content-neutral, the Supreme Court pointed to the distortion
that the ban had on the legal system. The Court found that while
the government encouraged the use of the state and federal
courts and the independent bar by subsidizing LSC attorneys, the
restriction on how attorneys could advise their clients and what
arguments could be presented altered the role of attorneys so
much as to distort the legal system. °° The Court considered the
prohibited activities (advocacy regarding the constitutionality of
welfare laws) to be speech necessary for the proper functioning of
the legal system. 1' To illustrate this point, the Court noted that if
an LSC-funded attorney representing a client in a welfare bene-
fits case were asked by a judge if there was a constitutional con-
cern present, the restriction would prohibit the attorney from an-
swering the question.' Because the judiciary's primary mission
is to interpret both the law and the Constitution, 3 the result of
9 1996 Act, § 504(a)(7).
See Velazquez, 164 F3d at 769.
9' Id at 770. Prior to the Court's distinction of Rust on the basis of government versus
private speech, the Second Circuit distinguished the facts from Rust by noting that the
speech at issue, namely expression on public issues and the right to criticize government
policy, is a more protected category of speech than abortion counseling. See id at 770-71.
See id at 771.
Id at 772.
Velazquez, 531 US at 544.
... See id.
Id at 545.
Id, citing Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137, 177 (1803).
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the restriction would be an under-informed judiciary due to the
attorney's inability to address constitutional questions surround-
ing statutory viability.
1 0 4
The Velazquez analysis can be applied to the class action
prohibition as well to support a finding of viewpoint discrimina-
tion. The first argument is that the class action prohibition re-
stricts how attorneys may advise their clients and what argu-
ments the attorney may present to the court, and thus distorts
the functioning of the legal system in much the same way as was
found with the suits for benefits restriction. The Supreme Court
clearly stated that the proper exercise of the courts depends upon
attorneys being able to present "all the reasonable and well-
grounded arguments necessary for the proper resolution of [a]
case."' °5 If the LSC-funded attorney is prevented from filing a
class action, she must present her suit in the context of her cli-
ent's experience only. The court may then get the impression that
the acts of the other party were isolated or limited to this client,
when in fact the client's experience may be merely an example of
a systematic pattern of illegal behavior on the part of the other
party.
Second, the class action prohibition distorts an attorney's
representation of her client. Under the 1996 restrictions, an at-
torney may not provide any advice to the client regarding the
possibility of filing the client's suit as a class action. The attorney
is permitted to advise clients about the pendency and effects of a
class action which has already been filed, and can represent a
client who wants to withdraw from or opt out of an existing class
action. °6 But if the same client were to approach an attorney with
her individual complaint, the attorney is restricted in the advice
she can offer. LSC-funded attorneys are forbidden from initiating
or participating in class actions, and the prohibition extends to
the provision of advice on filing class actions. 7 If a client's com-
plaint is best litigated as a class action, the client's representa-
tion and the legal system as a whole become distorted because
the LSC attorney is forced to present an inferior method for seek-
ing relief.' And for those whose claims can only be filed as a
"' Velazquez, 531 US at 545.1 Id.
See 61 Fed Reg 63754, 63755.
107 See 1996 Act, § 504(a)(7).
"' See Laura K. Abel and David S. Udell, If You Gag the Lawyers, Do You Choke the
Courts? Some Implications for Judges When Funding Restrictions Curb Advocacy By Law-
yers On Behalf of the Poor, 29 Fordham Urb L J 873, 884-85 (2002) (noting the discrep-
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class action, °9 their suits will be driven from the marketplace if
LSC-funded attorneys cannot file such cases on their behalf.
Incomplete advice and argument to the court distorts the
functioning of the judicial system and harms the client. A signifi-
cant number of the poor's problems occur to them as a class and
are of the variety that the class action device is specifically aimed
to help: small claims and persistent maltreatment by a person or,
more likely, an entity." 9 A class action is more likely to yield last-
ing results and be broader-based in terms of the relief it provides,
and it is a more effective deterrent than an individual suit."'
Moreover, because the legal problems of the poor may be institu-
tional in nature, the class action is all the more important given
that institutional change rarely results from individual suits."2
Third, in Velazquez, the Court found that the effect of the
ban on suits for benefits was to insulate government policies from
judicial inquiry by sifting out cases presenting constitutional
challenges." 3 According to the Court, even in suits that were liti-
gated, the restriction would result in lingering suspicion on the
part of both the judiciary and the public as to whether the LSC-
funded attorney had undertaken a complete analysis of the case,
given full advice to the client, or properly presented the case to
the court."4 The same can be said of a class action restriction,
particularly when the LSC attorney, judge, and opposing counsel
ancy in powers of discovery and the resultant facts available depending on whether a case
is filed individually or as a class action).
" See, for example, id at 882, 885-86 (providing examples of potential LSC clients
who are denied relief because their claims are not incorporated into a class action, and
noting that class actions are particularly appropriate for groups such as residents in adult
homes and migrant workers who may be afraid to participate in individual cases for fear
of retaliation); Roth, 33 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 155-56 (cited in note 15) (explaining that
class actions may provide essential relief in cases where someone who is not a party to the
initial litigation may never obtain relief). For a general discussion of why certain claims
may only be filed as a class action, see Deposit Guaranty National Bank of Jackson, Mis-
sissippi, 445 US at 339 (noting that in cases where the cost of bringing suit exceeded the
benefit sought, potential claimants were not bringing suit); United States Parole Commis-
sion v Geraghty, 445 US 388, 402-03 (1980) (noting that rulemakers created the class
action to allow claimants with similar claims to spread the litigation costs amongst them-
selves in order to be able to sue the wrongdoer).
'0 See Houseman, 67 Fordham L Rev at 2204 (cited in note 16) (noting that the gov-
ernment agencies often take actions affecting a large group of people, including the poor).
.. See Failinger and May, 45 Ohio St L J at 17 (cited in note 11); see also Abel and
Udell, 29 Fordham Urb L J at 886 (cited in note 108) (noting that individual suits may
obtain relief for the litigant but allow the defendant to continue to discriminate against
others similarly situated).
... See Failinger and May, 45 Ohio St L J at 18, 30-32 (cited in note 11).
13 Velazquez, 531 US at 546.
114 Id.
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are repeat players. If the judge sees repeated cases with similar
fact patterns, she may wonder whether any of the individual
cases were properly presented to the court or analyzed in a man-
ner best resolving the clients' claims.
Aside from the Velazquez analysis, there are other reasons to
find the class action prohibition unconstitutional. Restricting how
the attorney may advise the client, as well as how she may in-
form the court, truncates the attorney's presentation to the court
in a way that implicates protected speech and expression."' Liti-
gation theories are a protected form of expression,"6 and the
speech at issue here, expression on public issues and criticism of
government policy, is accorded the highest protection under the
First Amendment."7 The Court views such a restriction on attor-
ney advocacy and judicial function as "serious and fundamen-
tal. ,,H8
That the LSC attorney could withdraw from a case touching
restricted activities is beside the point. The Court recognized in
Velazquez that the LSC was created precisely to provide legal
representation to those who are unable to afford an alternate
source of legal assistance." 9 The lack of an alternate channel for
the expression that Congress sought to restrict made such a re-
striction on the expression unconstitutional.'20 For these reasons,
the Court also rejected the argument that the client could find a
non-LSC attorney to represent him with regards to the restricted
speech. 21
The viewpoint against which the class action prohibition dis-
criminates has been described as one that seeks to hold the gov-
"5 Id at 545.
"' See Tashima v Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 967 F2d 1264,
1270 (9th Cir 1992) (establishing that the litigation strategy and views of a party on a
matter constitute legitimate forms of expression protected by the First Amendment).
" See Velazquez, 164 F3d at 771.
.. Velazquez, 531 US at 544.
..9 Id at 546.
"" Id at 546-47.
.. Because of the desirability to be represented by counsel familiar with one's own
institutions and issues, finding a non-LSC lawyer may be even more difficult for a client
seeking class action representation than for a client filing a suit for benefits. See Recom-
mendations of the Conference on the Delivery of Legal Services to Low-Income Persons, 67
Fordham L Rev 1751, Recommendation 6, at 1754 (1999) (noting that in order to represent
a group of indigent clients, an attorney must have a detailed understanding of the group's
history and objectives, as well as of the characters and institutions with which the group
frequently interacts). In fact, it may be even more difficult for a client to find a non-LSC
lawyer to file a class action because it is precisely the LSC-funded lawyer, not the pro bono
attorney in private practice, who is likely to have exposure and access to a class of clients
suffering the same harm.
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ernment accountable for its actions, particularly when the actions
infringe upon substantive rights.' This is precisely what the
suits for benefits restriction prevented when it banned arguments
on the constitutionality of welfare laws, and the class action re-
striction should be considered unconstitutional for the same rea-
sons.
123
It has also been suggested that the 1996 restrictions impli-
cate certain other First Amendment rights, namely, the right of
association12 and the right to petition the government for griev-
ances.125 The Court has recognized these rights as being "among
the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of
Rights, 26 and has warned against making such rights "hollow
promise[s]" by denying groups the means to exercise these
rights.2 7 Those who support restrictions on LSC acknowledge
that it is legitimate to file suits on behalf of individuals who are
being denied funds improperly or who are being treated improp-
erly by the state,12 yet offer no reason why suits on behalf of agroup so situated are not just as legitimate.'2 9
... See Roth, 33 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 121 (cited in note 15).
" Some still may view the total effect of the class action restriction as only disparate
impact, and thus not worthy of constitutional scrutiny. In response, see Susan H. Wil-
liams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U Pa L Rev 615, 715 (1991)
(arguing that disparate impact cases should be treated as a type of content discrimination
deserving of strict scrutiny).
,' See LASH, 961 F Supp at 1410, citing California Motor Transport Co v Trucking
Unlimited, 404 US 508, 510-11 (1972) ("[Ilt would be destructive of rights of association
and petition to hold that groups with common interests may not... use the channels and
procedures of state and federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points of
view.").
" See California Motor Transport Co v Trucking Unlimited, 404 US 508, 510 (1972)
(finding that the right to access the courts is an aspect of the right of petition). See also
Larkin, 34 Judges' J at 3 (cited in note 23) (stating that anyone who has a grievance
should have the opportunity to have it addressed by the judiciary).
... United Mine Workers v Illinois State Bar Association, 389 US 217, 222 (1967).
' United Transportation Union v State Bar of Michigan, 401 US 576, 585-86 (1971).
See also Dawson v Delaware, 503 US 159, 163 (1992) and John Leubsdorf, Constitutional
Civil Procedure, 63 Tex L Rev 579, 590-91 (1984) (recognizing that the right to present
claims to the court extends to groups as well as individuals).
"2 See End Legal-Aid Program for Poor?, Interview with Edwin Meese III, Counselor
to the President, US News & World Rep 34 (Aug 3, 1981).
12 See Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agen-
cies Appropriations Act, 1996, Domenici amendment No 2819, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Sept
29, 1995), remarks of Senator Frank Lautenberg (NJ), in 141 Cong Rec S 14573, 14607
(querying why a group of poor people harmed by wrongful conduct should be forced to
pursue a remedy individually). See also Failinger and May, 45 Ohio St L J at 17 (cited in
note 11) ("[G]roup representation devices such as the class action are often the most effec-
tive way of representing an individual poor person."); Reforming an 'Incredibly Political'
Agency, Interview with Donald Bogard, President, Legal Services Corporation, US News &
World Rep 67 (Oct 31, 1983) (acknowledging that some class action suits undertaken by
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One may counter that even if the class action prohibition im-
plicates First Amendment rights, the government is not required
to subsidize the exercise of these rights, regardless of how fun-
damental they may be.3' Once the government subsidizes some
speech, however, it cannot discriminate in its funding in a view-
point discriminatory manner, which is what Congress has done in
implementing the ban on class action involvement. 3'
III. STATE INTEREST
If actions by LSC attorneys are not government speech and
the restriction against class action involvement is viewpoint dis-
criminatory, the class action prohibition still may be upheld if the
government presents a compelling interest for imposing the re-
striction.'32 In Velazquez, the Second Circuit found no state inter-
est to justify the restriction against suits for benefits.' The Su-
preme Court noted that the government defended the suits for
benefits restriction on two grounds. First, the government argued
that the restriction was necessary to "define the scope and con-
tours of the federal program."'34 The Court rejected this proffered
interest, recognizing that it is circular for the government to
claim that any viewpoint discrimination inherent in the program
is permissible when the purpose of the program is to advocate
just that type of discrimination.'
Second, the government claimed that the suits for benefits
restriction was necessary to help the welfare system function
more efficiently, by removing complex challenges, such as those
LSC attorneys are "very worthwhile" and that the poor should have full access to the legal
system).
30 See Harris v McRae, 448 US 297, 315 (1980).
.3 See Leubsdorf, 63 Tex L Rev at 617-18 (cited at note 127) (arguing for a constitu-
tional right to class actions based on the established First Amendment right of freedom to
associate and present grievances to the court). According to Professor Leubsdorf, when the
only means by which an individual can seek redress from illegal acts is by filing a class
action, then the First Amendment should protect the individual's right to bring such an
action. See id at 618.
"2 See NAACP v Button, 371 US 415, 438 (1963) ("[Only a compelling state interest in
the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate can justify
limiting First Amendment freedoms."). See also Perry Education Association v Perry Local
Educators'Association, 460 US 37, 45 (1983) (noting in addition that the interest must be
narrowly tailored, and may be subject to time, place and manner restrictions provided
that there are ample alternatives for communication).Velazquez, 164 F3d at 772.
1 Velazquez, 531 US at 547.
32 Id ("Congress cannot recast a condition on funding as a mere definition of its pro-
gram in every case, lest the First Amendment be reduced to a simple semantic exercise.").
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challenging the constitutionality of the welfare laws.' 36 Again, the
Court dismissed this interest. Instead of finding such a limit on
welfare advocacy to be compelling, the Court viewed the restric-
tion as an attempt by the government to insulate its laws from
constitutional scrutiny.'
37
There are, similarly, no interests in the class action restric-
tion that are compelling. As the Court in Velazquez noted, the
danger in subsidized speech is in allowing the government to de-
fine its subsidization programs in an unchecked and self-
referential manner.' 38 For this reason and the reason put forth by
the Supreme Court in Velazquez, any argument that the point of
the restriction is to discourage class action lawsuits necessarily
must fail.
Moreover, the ban on class action involvement directly con-
tradicts provisions in the LSC Act regarding attorney responsi-
bilities and the purpose of the existence of the LSC. The LSC Act
specifically instructs the LSC to structure itself so as to provide
"the most economical and effective delivery of legal assistance to
persons in both urban and rural areas.""'9 If the goal of the LSC
truly is to meet the needs of as many of the poor as possible,' 6
then the government has every incentive to reduce litigation costs
by consolidating similar suits into a class action, thereby freeing
up more money to meet more of the indigent's legal needs."' In
addition, many in the legal aid community suggest that LSC
funds currently being used to adhere to the program integrity
1-16 Id.
1.7 Id.
" See Martin H. Redish and Daryl I. Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free Expres-
sion, 80 Minn L Rev 543, 575-76 (1996).
42 USC § 2996f(a)(3).
See Reforming an 'Incredibly Political' Agency, Interview with Donald Bogard,
President, Legal Services Corporation, US News & World Rep 66-67 (Oct 31, 1983) (not-
ing the great demand for legal services and encouraging LSC funds to be used to meet as
many legal needs as possible).
"' See Failinger and May, 45 Ohio St L J at 28 (cited in note 11) (arguing that Rule
23's primary goal is efficiency and that the resulting savings in attorney time through
group litigation ultimately enables more poor clients to be served); Abel and Udell, 29
Fordham Urb L J at 882 n 34 (cited in note 108) (noting that the prohibition on class ac-
tions leads to duplicative lawsuits which waste judicial resources). See also End Legal-Aid
Program for Poor?, Interview with Archibald Cox, Professor, Harvard Law School, US
News & World Rep 33 (Aug 3, 1981) quoting Professor Cox ("[Cllass actions are often the
most cost-effective way of benefiting people in need. If a single suit can establish the
rights of a class certified by a judge-possibly several thousand people-then that is the
best way to take care of the legal needs of the poor."); Eyak Native Village v Exxon Corp,
25 F3d 773, 781 (9th Cir 1994) (finding that even in cases where an individual suit could
be brought, the rule makers for Rule 23 thought it best to economize the judiciary's re-
sources by condensing similar claims into one suit).
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regulations mandating separate facilities 42 could be better spent
on the provision of legal services.
The LSC Act also states that "attorneys providing legal assis-
tance must have full freedom to protect the best interests of their
clients."' Attorneys do not have full freedom to protect their cli-
ents' interests when they are limited in what services they can
provide,4 5 particularly when a client's best interests are not im-
mediately apparent. An attorney may not always know at the
outset of a case whether a class action will be appropriate.' 6 If
the attorney thinks the class action might be appropriate, she
must turn away the client, and the client's needs will go unmet. If
the attorney accepts the client before realizing that the class ac-
tion is the most appropriate way to proceed, then the attorney
will be forced to withdraw from the case, the client's needs will
remain unmet, and time and resources will have been expended
without any appreciable result.4 ' Some scholars have argued that
this restriction on the use of class actions is contrary to the dic-
tate of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility because of
its impact on the attorney's ability to be an effective advocate for
the client.'
See 45 CFR § 1610.8.
See, for example, Udell, 17 Yale L & Pol Rev at 351-55 (cited in note 15) (detailing
the costs in time, energy, and money of adhering to the LSC program integrity regula-
tions). But see LASH, 145 F3d at 1027-29 (rejecting appellant's contention that the re-
quirement of separate staff and facilities greatly increases the difficulty of providing legal
services).
... 42 USC § 2996(6).
"' See Abel and Udell, 29 Fordham Urb L J at 884-85 (cited in note 108) (providing
examples of the court being unable to learn the complete facts about a defendant's prac-
tices because an individual client has limited powers of discovery compared to that of a
class in a class action). See also Udell, 17 Yale L & Pol Rev at 368 (cited in note 15) (stat-
ing that a single class action provides greater relief to a larger population than is possible
now with the 1996 restrictions).
See Houseman, 67 Fordham L Rev at 2199 (cited in note 16).
,, See Failinger and May, 45 Ohio St L J at 24-25 (cited in note 11) (posing hypotheti-
cal cases where an attorney must choose between meeting the legal needs of one versus
many clients).
"' See id at 6; Robert R. Kuehn, Shooting the Messenger: The Ethics of Attacks on
Environmental Representation, 26 Harv Envtl L Rev 417, 440 (2002) (characterizing limits
on the advocacy a client may receive as contrary to rules of professional responsibility).
See also Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub L No 93-355, 1974 USCCAN 3872,
3880-81 (analyzing the Legal Services Act of 1974 § 7(7) and determining that the choice
of "how best to proceed in particular cases is always best left to the attorney and client,
and the Corporation should not seek to substitute its judgment for that of the attorney in
determining how best to serve the interests of particular clients").
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CONCLUSION
The debate over what types of noncriminal legal activities the
LSC should fund mirrors a larger debate on the extent to which
the government should subsidize the needs of the poor.'49 Despite
arguments that the Legal Services Corporation was created to
address the needs of individual poor people, 5' there is plenty of
evidence that the federally-funded poverty law program was di-
rected from its inception to serve the interests of the poor as a
group, particularly by engaging in class action lawsuits. 5' This is
supported by data showing that at the time of the LSC's incep-
tion, there was less than one lawyer for every ten thousand peo-
ple below the poverty line, which implies that Congress did not
intend to provide enough money to meet the needs of individual
poor clients. 5 ' Although the poor are not recognized as a suspect
class, deserving of strict scrutiny under constitutional due proc-
ess analysis,'53 some scholars have argued that the legal needs of
the poor are equivalent to those of criminal litigants in terms of
the losses at stake, such as loss of economic liberty, loss of means
of support, and loss of spouse and children.' And while some jus-
tify the 1996 restrictions by saying that they leave the poor no
worse off than if the LSC never existed,55 many argue that both
scenarios, restricted services and no services, are unacceptable.'
149 An earlier debate existed between those who believe legal assistance should be
provided to attack the causes and effects of poverty, and those who viewed legal assistance
as a means of providing as many poor individuals as possible with access to the courts. See
Failinger and May, 45 Ohio St L J at 5 (cited in note 11). The authors argue that both of
these models are consistent with group-oriented approaches to legal assistance for the
poor. See id at 55. This debate also has been characterized as one between "impact" and
'service" cases. See Udell, 17 Yale L & Pol Rev at 362 (cited in note 15).
" See note 11.
... See Failinger and May, 45 Ohio St L J at 14, 20 (cited in note 11), citing Jean and
Edgar Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 Yale L J 1317, 1332-33,
1338-40 (1964) and Departments of Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare, and Re-
lated Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1971, Hearings on HR 18515 Before the
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 91st Cong, 2d Sess, pt 2 at
534.
1 See id at 20, citing L. Goodman and M. Walters, The Legal Services Program: Re-
source Distribution and the Low Income Population 11-59 (Bur Soc Sci Research 1975).
'" See San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 29 (1973)
(finding that wealth discrimination is not an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny).
' See Failinger and May, 45 Ohio St L J at 12 (cited in note 11).
See Velazquez, 531 US at 556 (Scalia dissenting).
See, for example, Larkin, 34 Judges' J at 1-2 (cited in note 23) (noting that pro se
cases are a growing and significant problem for the courts). For a general discussion of the
effect on the poor of the restriction on class action involvement by LSC attorneys, see
Taking the Offensive-Summit on Court Strategy, 40 San Diego L Rev 115 (2003).
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The Velazquez Court's finding that one of the 1996 restric-
tions constitutes viewpoint discrimination and distorts the func-
tioning of the judiciary can apply to the class action prohibition
as well. The government is not speaking or funding others to con-
vey a governmental message when it finances LSC. Despite
claims of being "activist," the LSC has continued to address the
social issues faced by the poor, as envisioned by President
Nixon. 57 The position LSC clients take on these social issues is a
viewpoint-one against which Congress has impermissibly dis-
criminated in its decision to fund only certain legal services. The
government has not provided any compelling interest for silenc-
ing viewpoints that may only be expressed in a class action. Ac-
cordingly, it cannot select which types of arguments may be liti-
gated by the attorneys it funds.
Because the courtroom is considered the prime marketplace
for arguing a legal principle, and because the clients served by
the LSC, by definition, have few, if any, other options for legal
counsel, a prohibition on the use of legal procedures, such as a
class action, effectively ensures that the rights sought to be pro-
tected in the class action will not be heard in the legal market-
place. Such a result distorts the function of the courts by artifi-
cially removing arguments and theories from the province of
judges.158
Despite the presence of the Dobbins suit,159 there is concern
that the holding of Velazquez is too narrow and the political cul-
ture too fragile to support a challenge to the class action prohibi-
tion."' This Comment suggests that when and if legal challenges
to the class action prohibition surface in greater number, it is
possible to challenge the restriction on the basis of viewpoint dis-
crimination. Long before the 1996 restrictions, the ABA Commit-
tee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility declared that it was
"' See Failinger and May, 45 Ohio St L J at 18, 30-31 (cited in note 11) (noting that
opponents to the restrictions contended that this "activism" was necessary in some cases
to meet the basic legal needs of the poor). But see Larkin, 34 Judges' J at 2 (cited in note
23) ("LSC is not about promoting an agenda .... It is about providing access to the courts
and legal processes.").
" See Redish and Kessler, 80 Minn L Rev at 557-58 (cited in note 138) (arguing that
a negative subsidy such as refusing to fund class action involvement reduces the develop-
ment of the speaker and potential listeners by reducing the speech available for use in
community and legal decisions).
"' See Dobbins v Legal Services Corporation, 01 Civ 8371 (FB) (E D NY filed Dec 14,
2001), consolidated with Legal Services Corporation v Velazquez, 97 Civ 00182 (FB) (E D
NY Dec, 2001).
"o See Martin A. Schwartz, Legal Services Attorneys Gain Right to Contest Welfare
Rules, NY L J 3 (Apr 17, 2001).
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unethical to limit an attorney's ability to file a class action law-
suit when such relief was essential for the attorney's client.1 6' A
closer look at the class action prohibition shows that the restric-
tion infringes upon established First Amendment rights and runs
contrary to the mandate of the LSC-to provide high quality legal
services to those who cannot otherwise afford them.
"' See ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal and Infor-
mal Opinions, Formal Opinion 334 (ABA 1995). See also Megan Elizabeth Lewis, Note,
Subsidized Speech and the Legal Services Corporation: The Constitutionality of Defund-
ing Constitutional Challenges to the Welfare System, 74 NYU L Rev 1178, 1209 (1999)
(arguing that the welfare benefits restrictions determine which causes of action a lawyer
may bring, interfere with the lawyer-client relationship, and skew debate within the fo-
rum).
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